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Abstract
With the foreclosure crisis continuing to impact individuals and communities across the country, understanding
the extent of its effect on political life is tantamount. In this paper, we ask how political behaviors are influenced
by the economic adversities created by this crisis: loss of home, loss of resources, and perhaps loss of political
efficacy. Previous research on economic adversity focuses almost exclusively on unemployment. Here we
explore the demobilizing effects of foreclosures at the individual level, community levels, and the intersection of
individuals nested in communities. With a unique dataset that matches voter file data to a database on
individual foreclosures, we show that the foreclosure crisis was associated with a decline in voter turnout, both
individually and for those in neighborhoods hit harder by the foreclosure crisis. We find that homeowners facing
the loss of their homes were less likely to go to the polls. Consistent with previous research, we also show that

turnout was suppressed in neighborhoods with higher rates of foreclosure. Taken together, our results suggest
that political elites were less likely to hear from constituents most directly impacted by the foreclosure crisis.
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Over 9 million families lost their homes to foreclosure between 2006 and 2014 (Semuels [61]). Scholars have
well documented the "collateral damage" of the foreclosure crisis on property values (Immergluck and Smith
[30]; Harding et al. [26]; Gerardi et al. [21]), neighborhood crime (Immergluck and Smith [31]; Katz et al. [35];
Ellen et al. [18]), and housing sales (Rogers and Winter [51]). Less clear is how the foreclosures impacted political
inequality in America. The bursting of the housing bubble left few areas of the country unscathed, but
disproportionately affected less advantaged homeowners (Pfeffer et al. [48]). The crisis also widened racial
disparities. African Americans and Latinos, for example, were more likely to face foreclosure relative to their
share of mortgage originations than non-Hispanic whites (Li [39]; Bocian et al. [ 9]). But did the crisis reduce
disparities in political voice, bringing neighbors together in protest (Bennett [ 7]; Levin et al. [38]) and motivating
greater political engagement (Brody and Sniderman [10])? Or did the crisis exacerbate the imbalance, causing
overwhelmed and overburdened Americans to withdraw from political life (Rosenstone [52]; Verba et al. [68])?
Despite the severity and reach of the foreclosure crisis, few studies have explored its influence on political
behaviors. Estrada-Correa and Johnson ([19]) use zipcode-level data from California to estimate the relationship
between the foreclosure rate (between August and October 2008) and voter turnout in the November 2008
election. Controlling for turnout in the 2008 primary, they find a one-point increase in the foreclosure rate was
associated with a 0.01-point drop in neighborhood turnout.[ 1] Their results suggest that the foreclosure crisis
reduced political participation in 2008, despite an overall increase in voter turnout that culminated with the
election of Barack Obama. But with only zipcode-level data on foreclosures, Estrada-Correa and Johnson
conclude that a "remaining unexamined link is the connection between declines in voter turnout due to
foreclosure and patterns of inequality in political disenfranchisement" (Estrada-Correa and Johnson [19], p. 574).
Our study builds upon the previous literature on economic adversity and turnout in three important ways. First,
we leverage a unique, individual-level dataset that matches voter file data to foreclosure filings to overcome the
limits of aggregate analyses. Instead of relying on ecological inference and nesting individuals within zipcodes hit
by various numbers of foreclosures, as Estrada-Correa and Johnson do, our data allow us to directly test
whether individuals facing foreclosure are less likely to vote. Are individuals facing foreclosure less likely to
vote as a result of the foreclosure? Second, we subject this hypothesis to a placebo test, looking to see if
foreclosures experienced in 2012 affect turnout in a previous presidential election. Finally, we replicate this
earlier work by examining the relationship between neighborhood foreclosure rates and voter turnout, but
extend the analysis to a different geographic context and test whether foreclosures also affected those who
were not themselves threatened with the loss of their homes.
Our results are consistent with resource models of political participation (see e.g. Verba et al. [68]): under a
number of rigorous specifications and conditions, we find individuals facing the loss of their homes were less
likely to participate in the 2012 presidential election. Our results on whether the effects of foreclosure spilled
over onto the neighbors of troubled homeowners are more mixed. We find no evidence of a contextual
influence of foreclosure rates, but in a supplemental analysis that disaggregates neighborhoods by median
household income, we present suggestive evidence that turnout was lower in middle-income neighborhoods
with higher rates of foreclosure. Taken together, we find that the foreclosure crisis increased political inequality,
depressing turnout among those facing foreclosure and possibly dampening the political engagement of

working-class and middle-class homeowners living in neighborhoods experiencing the shock of the housing
crisis.

Economic Adversity and Voting
By far, the most common understanding of economic adversity in the political science literature has focused on
unemployment. Several studies have concluded that unemployment has short- and long-term consequences on
civic participation (Verba et al. [68]; Wilson [71]; Rotolo and Wilson [54]). In this paper, we expand the
conceptualization of economic adversity and focus on the loss of homeownership via foreclosures. Our
expectation is the mechanisms by which employment influences political participation—resources, social
networks—can be extended to homeownership. We also consider whether these losses were felt at a
community level. To do so, we test whether housing distress explains contextual variation in neighborhood
turnout, even after accounting for the individual experience of foreclosure. Below, we review the relevant
literature on how individual and community losses condition voting behavior, present our hypotheses and
discuss how our study addresses some of the limitations of previous research on the foreclosure crisis.

Individual Loss and Political Participation

Foreclosures lead to individual distress via several direct and indirect pathways, each depressing political
participation. First, and perhaps most obviously, individuals who lose their home face economic hardships.
Resource models of participation provide convincing evidence that socioeconomic factors drive opportunities
and abilities to participate (Verba et al. [68]; Schlozman et al. [60]). In much the same way, foreclosure may lead
to less civic participation because individuals facing housing distress are likely to lose many of these resources,
including time, interest, and money.
Second, foreclosures may reduce the likelihood of voting indirectly by making it less likely that citizens are asked
to participate (Rosenstone and Hansen [53]). Organizations and campaign operatives may avoid those
neighborhoods hit hardest by the collapse of the housing market, thinking that their mobilization efforts will
bear greater fruit elsewhere. Foreclosures may also make it more difficult to find potential voters. Indeed,
heading into the 2010 gubernatorial recall election in Wisconsin, canvassers from the League of Young Voters
were only able to find 31% of their targets in Milwaukee; twice that number were missed either because the
residence identified on the voter file was now abandoned or because the targeted voter no longer lived there
(Issenberg [33]).
Last, losing a home can indirectly affect other factors shown to influence voting behavior. Research has
documented the link between foreclosures and health (Saegert et al. [55]), loss of employment (Kingsley et al.
[37]), and marital tensions (Abramovitz and Albrecht [ 1]). Stated differently, voters who are insecure about
their basic needs are less interested in politics; they have more pressing concerns (Wolfinger and Rosenstone
[72]).
In sum, the extant theoretical literature implies that at the individual level, foreclosures may decrease political
participation via a number of mechanisms that influence a person's resources and social networks.[ 2]

Neighborhood Context and Loss

In addition, we might reasonably anticipate variation across neighborhoods in the link between foreclosures and
voter turnout. Scholars have long noted that the broader contexts within which individuals are situated can also
have important implications for how various social problems and economic shocks are experienced and
perceived. Measured at the level of counties (Reeves and Gimpel [50]), metropolitan areas (Weatherford [70])
or zip codes (Newman et al. [43]), a robust literature finds a connection between perceptions of environment
and political attitudes and behaviors. Local contexts, for example, provide important frames of reference for

making inferences about national statistics and trends (Wong [73]; Ansolabehere et al. [ 3]). Building on theories
of social influence (Huckfeldt and Sprague [27]), the premise is that voters obtain relevant political information
through "the slow drip of everyday life" (Baybeck and McClurg [ 6], p. 498) by observation of their environment
and those around them. Thus, individual stressors might also have cumulative community effects. Importantly,
these effects are felt by everyone within the community—those who lost their home, and those who did not.
These neighborhood-level effects can influence political participation via three pathways.
First, foreclosures may lead to a vicious circle, as a neighborhood's reputation is damaged, and additional
families leave. Potential buyers will back away from declining neighborhoods, leaving more houses empty
(Saegert et al. [55]). In turn, this downward spiral may diminish neighborhood ties and the size of social
networks, limit the community's social capital and efficacy (Sampson and Raudenbush [58]; Sampson [57]), and
otherwise impair community functioning (Abramovitz and Albrecht [ 1]).
Second, community loss may mean that neighborhoods are no longer seen as places of refuge, but rather as
sources of stress. Abandoned homes increase crime, weaken social bonds, and reduce sense of safety. In
creating residential turnover (Li and Morrow-Jones [40]), foreclosures make it more difficult for neighborhoods
to maintain social control (Sampson et al. [59]) and reduce neighborhood-level civic engagement (Kang and
Kwak [34]). And given that voting can be contagious (Nickerson [44]; Sinclair [63]) and subject to social pressures
(Davenport et al. [15]), foreclosures may also lower neighborhood turnout by removing the social norms and
motivations that stimulate voting participation.
Last, abandoned homes create socially disorganized neighborhoods, disrupting communication among
community residents, weakening collective and individual efficacy, and diminishing capacities for mobilization
(Baumer et al. [ 5]). Thus, the foreclosure crisis may isolate residents from the societal mainstream and reduce
confidence in institutions, such as banks and local civic groups (Vidmar [69]; Saegert et al. [55]). The stigma,
isolation and demoralization that are associated with loss are often experienced by many within the community.
And this sense of loss may cause individuals to withdraw further from community life, thereby weakening the
social fabric and social supports that could help manage these losses. In this way, individual losses accumulate
and undermine community function.
To sum, individual factors matter, but previous research on voter behavior also finds that their effects can be
conditioned by neighborhood context. Those threatened with the loss of their homes may be less likely to vote,
but foreclosures might also affect voting participation more broadly by changing the composition of
neighborhoods and the social dynamics within them. In this study, we capitalize on individual-level data that can
be nested into neighborhoods to provide an empirical test of both the individual and community effects of
foreclosure on voter turnout. In particular, we test two hypotheses:

H1 All else equal, individuals facing foreclosure will be less likely to vote (Individual loss).
H2 All else equal, voter turnout will be lower in neighborhoods with higher foreclosure rates.
(Community loss).

Study Design
We examine the relationship between foreclosures and voter turnout in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin in the
2012 presidential election. As was the case in other real estate markets, Milwaukee County experienced a
devastating increase in foreclosures between 2005 and 2011. Foreclosure filings in Milwaukee County increased
from an average of 2617 foreclosure filings per year from 2000 to 2005 to almost 7000 per year in 2008 and
2009 (City of Milwaukee [12]). Milwaukee County shares much with the national picture of economic hardship,

and is representative of the greater foreclosure crisis, particularly of many mid-sized cities with racially
heterogeneous populations.

Data and Methods3
We utilize the Wisconsin voter files for Milwaukee County to construct our dependent variable. The voter files
include the name, residential address, estimated race/ethnicity, estimated household income, estimated
education, estimated homeownership and vote history of registered voters in the county.[ 4]Turnout is defined
by a dichotomous measure of whether the registered voter went to the polls in the 2012 presidential election (1
= yes, 0 = no). As we explain in detail below, we restrict our analysis to registered voters who own their homes.
We then geocode and match registered voters to a database of foreclosure filings (2006–2012).[ 5] (Detail about
how we matched the voter file to foreclosure filings is available in Online Appendix.) Out of 225,287 registered
voters who are estimated to be homeowners, we matched 1431 voters (or 0.64%) to owner-occupied residences
that were in our database of foreclosure filings for the 2012 calendar year.
We use these matched data to construct a dichotomous measure of Individual Foreclosure that equals one if the
individual faced foreclosure in 2012. Given the nature of the foreclosure dataset, which only identifies property
owners facing foreclosure, we focus on homeowners and exclude renters who may have faced foreclosureinduced relocation. We code cohabitants of those listed in our database of foreclosure filings as also facing
foreclosure. In total, 3017 registered voters in Milwaukee County lived in owner-occupied residences facing
foreclosure in 2012.
We include the estimated race/ethnicity of the voter, captured by dichotomous measures for Black, Latino,
or Asian (non-Hispanic whites are the excluded group), as well as the estimated Education, Income, and Age of
the registered voter.[ 6] Because prior voting behavior is predictive of current voting behavior, we also control for
prior turnout (Voted in 2008) to help account for other unobserved individual-level correlates of turnout that are
unavailable in the voter file.
In addition to these individual-level variables, we utilize block group-level data from the 2010 US Census to
capture demographic and socioeconomic variation across neighborhoods (% Black, % Latino, % Asian, Median
Household Income, and % Homeowners). Census block groups represent roughly 1300 residents, a geographic
unit that most closely approximates how individuals define their neighborhoods (see e.g., Sampson et al. [59]).
We calculate the Foreclosure Rate for each block group by taking the number of foreclosures and dividing by the
2010 Census estimates of the total number of housing units for each block group. Foreclosure rates in 2012
ranged from 0 to 6% across neighborhoods.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics by foreclosure status, and a couple of points are noteworthy.
Participation in the 2012 election was lower amongst those individuals facing foreclosure, but not by huge
margins. Perhaps most striking is the racial differences between groups—following national trends, African
American, Latino and Asian homeowners in Milwaukee county were more likely to face the loss of their homes
(Li [39]; Bocian et al. [ 8], [ 9]). Moreover, and not surprisingly, individuals facing foreclosure live in poorer
neighborhoods, though the experience of foreclosure is not confined to low-wealth contexts.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics—by foreclosure

Variable
Individual-level
Voted in 2012
Voted in 2008
Black
Latino
Asian
Age
Age missing
Income
Income missing
Education
Education missing
Neighborhood-level
Foreclosure rate (2012)
% Black
% Latino
% Asian
% Homeowners
Median household
income

Individuals facing
foreclosure
Mean

Max

Individuals not facing
foreclosure
Mean

SD

Min

SD

Min

Max

0.91
0.85
0.29
0.08
0.03
52.37
0.43
5.07
0.06
3.25
0.14

0.29
0.36
0.45
0.26
0.16
11.26
0.50
2.05
0.23
1.06
0.35

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
20.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
89.00
1.00
11.00
1.00
5.00
1.00

0.92
0.88
0.14
0.05
0.02
55.43
0.47
5.43
0.06
3.24
0.16

0.27
0.32
0.34
0.22
0.13
11.45
0.50
2.13
0.24
1.07
0.36

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
20.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
99.00
1.00
11.00
1.00
5.00
1.00

0.02
0.34
0.09
0.03
0.54
48,652

0.01
0.34
0.15
0.03
0.23
20,686

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
11,402

0.06
0.99
0.82
0.44
0.99
186,154

0.01
0.19
0.09
0.03
0.64
57,057

0.01
0.29
0.13
0.03
0.22
26,661

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
7170

0.06
0.99
0.83
0.57
0.99
250,001

To assess the effect of neighborhood context and our other control variables on turnout, we estimate a
multilevel model, which allows us to account for the clustered structure to our data (Raudenbush and Bryk [49];
Steenbergen and Jones [66]). We model turnout as a function of individual-level covariates (Individual
Foreclosure, Black, Latino, Asian, Income, Education, Voter's Age, Voted in 2008) and neighborhood-level
covariates (% Black, % Latino, % Asian, Median Household Income, % Homeowners, and Foreclosure Rate), and
we include random effects for census block groups and households to account for the non-independence of
observations within our nested dataset.

Results
Table 2 presents our main results for hypothesis 1. We begin with a basic model ( 1) that includes individuallevel covariates and random effects for household and neighborhood. Individuals facing foreclosure were less
likely to vote in the 2012 presidential election, holding constant race, ethnicity and prior turnout in the 2008
presidential election. The substantive difference translates into about a one-percentage point decrease in the
likelihood of voting for those registered voters facing foreclosure.[ 7] To put our estimated effect of foreclosure
into context, treatment effects from field experiments of get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts tend to range from 7
to 10 points (Gerber and Green [22]; Gerber et al. [23]; Green et al. [25]). However, as Arceneaux and Nickerson
([ 4]) point out, such mobilization efforts have little effect on high-propensity voters in salient elections. The
estimated effect of foreclosure among our sample of high propensity voters—homeowners who are already
registered to vote—is thus significant, likely larger than the effect of a campaign contact. Our findings are also in
line with other research on the demobilizing effects of economic hardship. For example, Levin et al. ([38]) find
that poor pocketbook evaluations are associated with about a 2–3 percentage point drop in the likelihood of
voting.

Table 2: Model estimates

Dependent variable
Individual foreclosure
Foreclosure rate (2012)
Vote 2008
Vote 2006
N (individual)
N (neighborhoods)

(1)
Individual
Vote12
− 0.166*
(0.089)
1.483***
(0.028)

(2)
Ind. + contextual
Vote12
− 0.146*
(0.089)
− 1.933
(1.617)
1.470***
(0.028)

225,287
857

225,287
857

(3)
Placebo Test
Vote08
− 0.016
(0.085)

3.216***
(0.032)
225,287
857

(4)
Matched
Vote12
− 0.246**
(0.098)

(5)
Matched
Vote12
− 0.245**
(0.098)
− 1.052
(2.848)

12,529

12,529

Multilevel logistic regression with random effects for neighborhood (Census block groups) and households. Full
models (with control variables) available in Appendix Table A ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
Next, we consider Hypothesis 2, the influence of community loss. In model 2, we report the results when
including the neighborhood foreclosure rate. The coefficient on individual foreclosure remains negative and
statistically significant, suggesting that the individual loss of a home exacts an economic and psychological toll
that depresses political engagement, even after accounting for neighborhood-level differences in income,
homeownership, and racial composition. However, we do not find support for our community loss hypothesis,

which posits lowered voter turnout in communities facing higher foreclosure rates. We examine the community
loss hypothesis in greater detail below, but before those analyses, report on our robustness checks.
Though these results suggest that the threat of losing one's home depresses turnout, it is possible that the
estimated coefficient on Individual Foreclosure is spurious, reflecting other unmeasured individual-level
differences that are related to both political engagement and the likelihood of facing foreclosure. To address this
possibility, we first estimate a placebo model that tests whether experiencing foreclosure in 2012 predicts voter
turnout in the previous presidential election (model 3). The insignificant coefficient on Individual
Foreclosure gives us greater confidence in our main finding.
Another potential weakness in the above analysis is that individuals facing foreclosure may simply be
"incomparable" to individuals not facing foreclosure (King and Zeng [36]). Thus, as a final robustness check, we
use Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. [28]) to help eliminate differences between the treatment and
control group (models 4 and 5).[ 8] We matched on age, race, ethnicity, education, income, voter history,
municipality and block-level measures of racial and economic composition. The result was a treatment group of
1622 and a control group of 10,907.[ 9] After matching, we have two groups that differ solely on the treatment
effect: individual foreclosures. The negative effects of individual foreclosure on voting remain significant, and
substantively point to a 2-percentage point decrease in the likelihood of voting. Together, these results suggest
our findings on the individual effects of foreclosure are robust: homeowners facing the loss of their homes were
less likely to vote in 2012.

Community Effects in Context
Existing residential patterns in the United States are characterized by high levels of inequality and differentiation
between neighborhoods (Firebaugh and Farrell [20]; Michener [42]; Sharkey [62]; Soss and Weaver [65]). As we
see in Fig. 1, the prevalence of foreclosures is higher in lower-income communities, adding an additional layer of
unequal stratification. But though there is an inverse relationship between neighborhoods' median household
income and foreclosure rates, the correlation between the two is modest (− 0.09). To provide further insight into
this contextual variation, we categorize neighborhoods by wealth (shown by the dashed lines in Fig. 1). Here we
define middle-income neighborhoods as those with a median household income two-thirds to double the
county's median household income (about $47,000), and low-income (high-income) neighborhoods below
(above) those cutpoints.[10] Though foreclosure rates were higher in low-income neighborhoods, a substantial
number of homes in middle-income neighborhoods were also beset by foreclosures, and we see some variation
in foreclosure rates even within high-income neighborhoods.

Fig. 1 Foreclosure rates by median household income. Dashed lines are cut-off points delineating lower-income
communities (Census block groups with median household incomes that are two-thirds or less of area median
household income), middle-income communities (Census block groups with median household incomes two-

thirds to two times the area median household income) and higher-income communities (Census block groups
with median household income more than twice as large as the area median household income)
As a result of this differentiation between neighborhoods, the experience of "everyday life" that we argue
conditions the effects of foreclosure, may be quite different depending on the community context. For example,
research suggests that low-income neighborhoods experience a high level of what we might call "baseline
distress," characterized by greater economic uncertainty, more vacant homes, and more precarious housing
options (Niedt and Martin [45]). In conjunction with a greater likelihood of foreclosure, we might expect lowincome neighborhoods to fall more deeply into detachment from political life (see e.g., Cohen and Dawson [13];
Michener [42]).[11] On the other hand, it may be the case that the additional layer of distress goes mostly
unnoticed. In her study of Boston, Graves ([24]) finds that many residents in a low-income neighborhood did not
differentiate or know the status of vacant homes versus foreclosed homes. Thus, the effects of foreclosures on
voting behavior in low-income neighborhoods may be less pronounced.
The effects in middle- and high-income neighborhoods are equally speculative. We know voters in these
communities have comparably low levels of baseline distress, and thus the experience of foreclosures in the
community might be a greater shock and possibly more demobilizing, leading to lower voter turnout. But we
also know that more affluent neighborhoods have access to the very resources and social capital cited above
that can maintain community stability in the face of crisis. Thus, these less-distressed neighborhoods may be
insulated from the shocks of foreclosure.
Together then, the previous research suggests that the individual and community effects of foreclosure we
examine above may be conditioned on the income-level of the community. To test this possibility, in Table 3 we
report the results of individual and community variables on voting behavior for low-income (less than two-thirds
the median income), middle-income (two-thirds the median income to two times the median income), and highincome (greater than two times the median income) neighborhoods.
Table 3: Model estimates by neighborhood income

(1)
Low-income
Dependent variable
Vote12
Individual foreclosure
0.197
(0.197)
Foreclosure rate (2012) 3.204
(2.791)
Vote 2008
1.329***
(0.063)
N (individual)
29,858
N (neighborhoods)
254

(2)
Middle-income
Vote12
− 0.246**
(0.101)
− 4.504**
(2.079)
1.472***
(0.032)
177,304
563

(3)
High-income
Vote12
0.236
(0.596)
− 36.301***
(11.466)
1.756***
(0.117)
18,125
39

Multilevel logistic regression with random effects for neighborhood (Census block groups) and households. Lowincome defined as Census tracts with median household income less than two-thirds area median household
income. Middle-income defined as Census tracts with median household income two-thirds to two times area
median household income. High-income defined as Census tracts with median household income more than two
times area median household income. Full models (with control variables) available in Appendix Table B ***p <
0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
The results provide suggestive evidence that community context influences the effects of foreclosures. First, the
results from the multilevel model show that the political participation of individuals living in low-income

neighborhoods is unaffected by housing disruptions, both to themselves and within their community. The
cumulative impact of "additional distress" on already distressed communities that have lower voter turnout
does not appear to drop participation further.
The demobilizing effects of foreclosures, on the other hand, appear to be largely concentrated in middle-income
communities. Homeowners in these neighborhoods were approximately one percentage less likely to vote if
they were facing foreclosure, all else equal. These results also suggest that the demobilizing effect of
foreclosures may have extended to those not personally threatened with the loss of their homes. The coefficient
on the neighborhood's foreclosure rate is negative and statistically significant, even after taking into account the
individual-level experience of foreclosure. To help assess substantive meaning of these results, we estimate the
predicted probabilities of voting across the observed range of foreclosure rates in the county.[12] Our results
suggest that a homeowner not facing foreclosure was about 1 percentage point less likely to vote in 2012 if she
lived in a neighborhood with the highest rate of foreclosures than if she lived in lived in a neighborhood without
any. Overall, the depressive effect is small, though expected given our focus on the likelihood of voting among
high-propensity voters in a competitive presidential election, and consistent with what Estrada-Correa and
Johnson ([19]) find in California in the 2008 election.
The individual and community-level effects in high-income communities are also different than those found in
low- and middle-income places. Supporting our expectation that individuals with more resources may be more
resilient to loss, we find no effect for individual loss. In other words, the voting behavior of individuals living in
high-income neighborhoods who are themselves in foreclosure are not less likely to vote. The coefficient on the
neighborhood's foreclosure rate, on the other hand, is significant and negative. Though we want to be careful in
our interpretation given the smaller number of high-income neighborhoods in our dataset, these results suggest
that political engagement fell a bit in places experiencing the shock of the foreclosure crisis.
In conclusion, when we disaggregate our results by neighborhood wealth, our results do suggest that voting
participation was most sensitive to foreclosures in middle-income neighborhoods, and that even those not
personally facing foreclosure were affected. But we emphasize this result is suggestive; the large standard errors
for the statistically insignificant coefficients in the other models mean that we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis that the relationship between foreclosures (both at the individual-level and at the contextual-level)
and turnout differed in low, middle and high-income neighborhoods.

Discussion and Conclusion
With the foreclosure crisis continuing to impact individuals and communities across the country, understanding
the extent of the effect on political life is tantamount. We know that foreclosures result in lower rates of trust in
particular institutions, but we know little about how foreclosures impact voting behaviors. Estrada-Correa and
Johnson ([19]) show that Californians living in zip codes with high rates of foreclosure were less likely to vote in
the 2008 presidential election. However, their study was unable to test whether individuals facing foreclosure
were less likely to go to the polls. In this paper, we take advantage of a unique dataset that allows us to estimate
how the potential loss of home affects an individual's likelihood of voting.
We conclude that homeowners facing foreclosure were less likely to vote in the 2012 presidential election.
Under a number of modeling specifications and tests, we find strong evidence to suggest that individual housing
loss depressed voter turnout. Our unique dataset of individual-level voter and foreclosure data allowed a direct
test of the relationship between the threat of losing one's home and political participation. In line with the
resource theory of voting, and corroborating more recent research, our findings add to this scholarship, and
demonstrate that highly likely voters (homeowners who are registered to vote) are not immune to the negative

effects of loss. Moreover, we test the robustness of our central finding with a placebo test, showing that
foreclosures were unrelated to the likelihood of voting in a previous election.
Our findings around community loss, on the other hand, are more nuanced. We replicate earlier work showing
that neighborhood-level housing blight can depress turnout, but we find that this contextual variation was
largely concentrated in middle-income neighborhoods, home to larger shares of working-class and middle-class
homeowners. And these findings are speculative at best. A more refined analysis of contextual effects, such a
spatial analysis of neighbors (see e.g., Rogers and Winter [51]), may reveal spillover effects that drive
community impacts, and is one possible direction for further inquiry.
Together, our analysis makes several important contributions to the research on political inequality and political
participation. Our results suggest that the bursting of the housing bubble exacerbated political inequality,
depressing voting participation among those most directly affected by the financial and psychological costs of
foreclosure. Though we find that the foreclosure crisis deepened political inequality, additional questions
remain, and we encourage scholars to replicate our research in other geographic contexts and to consider the
interactions between economic and racial inequality. For example, the null results we find in low-income
communities suggest that foreclosures alone do not differentiate these more distressed neighborhoods.
However, there are also fewer homeowners in these neighborhoods, and it is possible that the effects of
foreclosure were more likely to be experienced by renters who are not included in our analysis. Given recent
research documenting the severity of evictions among those living in poverty, particularly in low-income
communities of color (Desmond [17]), future research should consider how the residential instability, material
deprivation, and mental stress induced by housing insecurity contributes to political inequality.
Moreover, we know that persons of color (Allen [ 2]) and low-income homeowners (Li [39]) have been more
likely to experience foreclosure. Recent research also suggests that the banks have better maintained realestate owned properties in non-Hispanic white and wealthier neighborhoods (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock [29]). We
did examine whether race and ethnicity moderated the relationship between foreclosures and turnout. Our
results suggest that black homeowners in Milwaukee County were more immune to the depressive effects of
foreclosure (reported in Table C in the Appendix). However, we caution readers against making too much of
these differences, as we suspect they may not generalize to other contexts given community organizing efforts
around foreclosures in select neighborhoods in the county.[13] To be sure, more research on this relationship is
warranted. Whether grassroots mobilization in response to the foreclosure crisis helped build or sustain political
efficacy in the face of economic hardship remains unclear, though our observations of such efforts suggest that
this may be a possibility.
Overall though our results point to a demobilizing effect Previous research finds that individuals withdraw from
political life in response to economic hardship, but especially when they interpret their adversity as stemming
from a personal rather than political failure (see e.g., SoRelle [64]).[14] As the wave of foreclosures caught millions
of Americans in its wake, it appears that troubled homeowners responded with political quiescence. The crisis
wiped out a substantial portion of Americans' wealth and helped reinforce high levels of racial and income
inequality: about a quarter of families lost at least 75% of their wealth (more than half lost at least 25%) and
these declines were concentrated among less advantaged Americans (Pfeffer et al. [48]). African American and
Hispanic families, for example, lost almost twice as much wealth as white families (McKernan et al. [41]). Over
the same time period, the top 1% saw gains in average wealth (Saez and Zucman [56]). Many have criticized the
Obama Administration's and Congress's responses to the bursting of the housing bubble, arguing that the
programs implemented to stem the fallout from the foreclosure crisis reflected the banking industry's preferred
policy choices rather than those that could have helped troubled homeowners the most (Dayen [16]); some
have even argued that US policy made more households vulnerable to foreclosure and extended the length of

the crisis (Cooper and Bruenig [14]). Our results suggest that political elites may have faced less pressure to
address the shortcoming and failures of the policies and programs implemented during the foreclosure crisis.
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Footnotes

1. They find similar results in a separate multilevel analysis that nests individuals in zipcodes; the
likelihood of going to the ballot box fell by 0.012 points for a one standard deviation increase in
the foreclosure rate of the voter's zipcode, a slight drop in participation, but comparable in size
to a one standard deviation shift in the proportion of the population living in poverty or holding
a bachelor's degree.
2. There is some evidence that economic hardship can increase political engagement when it is
sufficiently politicized and de-personalized. For example, Burden and Wichowsky's ([11]) study
of unemployment suggests that economic downturns might stimulate greater attention to
political information and vigilance in attributing blame, thus making it more likely that

individuals vote; this might be particularly the case in times of high unemployment (see
Incantalupo [32]).
3. Data and replication files available at 10.7910/DVN/WTXEVY.
4. Voter file information was purchased from L2Decisions (http://votermapping.com) and includes
estimates of additional covariates including race/ethnicity, income, education, age, and
homeownership. They use Census block-level data and other financial and lifestyle data to
create estimates of demographic information.
5. We thank the Fiscal and Economic Research Center (FERC) at the University of WisconsinWhitewater for providing us access to these data. Because data are often missing in real estate
websites such as Zillow, FERC has carefully coded each foreclosure filing for the state of
Wisconsin between 2006 and 2012.
6. We assign those with missing data the median value and create a dummy indicator for
missingness for age, education and income.
7. As expected, prior turnout is a strong predictor of voting participation, and compared to nonHispanic whites, the likelihood of voting participation was lower among Latino and Asian
registered voters. Consistent with the diminishing black-white gap in voter turnout nationally
(Taylor and Lopez [67]), we find no statistically significant turnout differences between black
and white registered voters in our sample. Full results are available in Appendix A.
8. See Appendix Table D for imbalance corrections. Coarsened Exact Matching takes into account
missingness in variables.
9. We did not match on contextual measures of foreclosures because we were interested in testing
whether turnout was also affected by the neighborhood's foreclosure rate.
10. We follow Pew Research Center's definition of low-income, middle-income and high-income (see
Pew Research Center [47]).
11. Michener ([42]) finds that under some conditions, perceptions of disorder (higher in lowerincome neighborhoods) can spark greater engagement, increasing the likelihood of attending a
community meeting. However, when it comes to engagement with formal political authorities,
the relationship is curvilinear (likely reflecting concerns about, and experiences with, law
enforcement), and objective measures of disorder remain negatively correlated with political
engagement.
12. We estimate predicted probabilities for a non-Hispanic white homeowner who voted in the 2008
presidential election, holding all other variables at their means.
13. In 2009, Common Ground, an affiliate of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), began a massive
campaign to address the foreclosure crisis in Milwaukee's Sherman Park neighborhood, an area
with some of the region's highest rates of black homeownership. Their efforts galvanized
residents, and in response to substantial community organizing efforts, tens of millions of
dollars have been reinvested in the neighborhood to help rehabilitate foreclosed properties and
restore the housing market in Sherman Park. Common Ground and other organizations
conducted GOTV campaigns in these same neighborhoods in 2012.
14. That said, there is nothing automatic about this response; economic adversity can be politicized
in ways that spur greater voting participation too (see Burden and Wichowsky [11]; Incantalupo
[32]).

